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Abstract
* 
This paper presents theory and evidence on the determinants of the size of the 
informal sector. We propose a simple theoretical model in which the informal 
sector’s size is negatively related to institutional quality and positively related 
to income inequality. These predictions are then empirically validated using 
different proxies of the size of the informal sector, income inequality, and 
institutional quality.  The results are shown to be robust with respect to a 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
A significant part of economic activity in developing as well as in developed countries is 
conducted in the informal sector.  Estimates suggest that, depending on the measure used, the 
relative size of the informal sector constitutes more than 30 percent of aggregate economic 
activity in developing countries and almost 20 percent in developed countries (see Table 1 
below).  While the informal sector’s effect on economic growth has been debated in the 
literature,
1 there is much concern that the informal sector causes erosion of the tax base and, 
ultimately, deterioration of publicly provided goods and services.  
  Consequently, some recent work has been devoted to the study of the determinants of 
informality.  In particular, the efforts have focused on various government interventions in the 
economy, such as through a high tax burden (e.g., Cebula, 1997; Giles and Tedds, 2002) and 
excessive regulation, especially in the labor market (as in Schneider and Enste, 2000; 
Schneider and Klingmair, 2003; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón, 1998).     
  In this paper, we take a fresh look at the determinants of the size of the informal 
sector.  Quite apart from intervention by the government, we argue that income inequality, in 
conjunction with institutional quality, is a significant factor in this regard. The reason for this 
is that, when property rights in the formal sector are poorly protected, resources are to a large 
extent up for grabs.  Poor individuals, whose endowments are relatively limited, are at a 
disadvantage in extracting a larger share of resources, hence find they it beneficial to move 
into the informal sector where, although less productive, they are able to fully retain their 
production output.  High inequality, exacerbated by low institutional quality, magnifies this 
effect, implying a positive relationship between inequality and the size of the informal sector.  
  A simple model that exhibits these properties is first presented and then empirically 
tested in this paper using recent estimates on the size of the informal sector that employ 
different proxies, as well as different econometric approaches.
2  Overall, we find that income 
inequality, particularly in conjunction with institutional quality, is a statistically significant 
                                                           
1 The relationship of the informal sector to economic outcomes has been the subject of some scrutiny recently. 
For instance, it has been suggested that a large informal sector implies, inter alia, slower economic growth 
(Loayza, 1996; Schneider and Klingmair, 2003); see Sarte (2000), however, for a more nuanced view. 
2 From a theoretical perspective, this work is related to a number of recent papers that generate informality in 
equilibrium, such as Acemoglu (1995), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), and Loayza (1996), among others.   
However, none of these papers focuses on income inequality.   
  5and substantively robust determinant of the relative size of the informal sector.  For example, 
depending on the specification, an increase in inequality level from that of Mexico (a Gini of 
0.49) to that of Brazil (a Gini of 0.57) one increases this size by about 3 to 4 percent.   
  While much of the earlier literature emphasizes the importance of the tax and 
regulatory burden, Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann et al. (2000), is the closest to the present 
endeavor in focusing on the role of institutional quality in shaping the relative size of the 
informal sector.  The main innovation here, both in the theoretical framework and in the 
empirical estimation, is including income inequality as another crucial factor in this regard.  
While uncovering the significance of these two, tax and labor regulatory components are also 
found to be significant—in line with much of the earlier work and unlike Friedman, Johnson, 
Kaufmann et al. (2000), where taxes are either found to be insignificant or negatively related 
to the size of the informal economy. 
  The next section presents the theoretical model including equilibrium analysis and 
comparative statics. Section 3 introduces the empirical approach and the data employed. 
Section 4 reports findings using ordinary least squares and instrumental variables, and Section 




Consider a two-period economy populated by a measure one of individuals indexed by i.  The 
initial level, in period 1, of individual i’s income is exogenously given at yi, and the income 
level in period 2, zi is endogenously determined.  We let H denote the cumulative distribution 
function of the initial income distribution.  Production takes place in the formal sector (FS) 
and in the informal sector (IS).  Aggregate productivity in the former is greater, but individual 
access to productive technology is limited—through licensing, regulation, etc.  Individuals 
must therefore expend resources to gain access to these technologies.  In contrast, in the 
informal sector productivity is smaller, but the technology used is readily accessible by all 
households. 
In general, individuals allocate resources between current consumption, ci1, productive 
investment, ki, and—in the formal sector—investment in overcoming licensing and regulation 
  6barriers, xi , in order to gain access to production technologies. Normalizing all prices to one, 
the budget constraint is thus 
 
yi = ci1 + ki + xi d (1) 
 
where d = 0 when the individual is the informal sector, and d = 1 when he is in the formal 
sector. 
  In the informal sector, the production function is 
 
zi  =  Bki, B > 0   (2) 
 
where B>0 is the productivity parameter in the IS. 
  In contrast, the aggregate productivity parameter in the formal sector, A, is larger, and 
A > B. Production opportunities, however, are endogenously determined through individual 
efforts as well as through the prevailing rule of law system.  Specifically, where the rule of 
law is strong, individual marginal efforts are insignificant in determining the allocation of 
production opportunities.  Letting L, 0<L<1, denote the degree of the rule of law, individual 
i’s productivity parameter is  
 
ai = A xi







and her second-period income level is 
 
zi =  aiki   (4) 
 
Note that the larger L is the lower is the marginal value of spending resources to gain access 
to the technology in the formal sector and the more equally is this access allocated.   
Unlike the traditional view used to define the informal sector that focuses on the size 
and the type of technology of the firm and the occupation of the worker, we follow recent 
research that shows that most businesses and workers base their decision to enter and staying 
in the formal sector depending on the evaluation of the relative benefits and costs of doing so 
(Saavedra and Chong, 1999; Maloney, 1999).
3 Such evaluations are continuously revised by 
                                                           
3 In the traditional view, the size of the informal sector is tied with the size distribution of firms so that an 
increase in the share of small businesses in total employment is interpreted as an increase in the share of the 
informal sector (Cole and Fayissa, 1991). This direct relationship between these two variables does not 
necessarily hold when using a cost-benefit definition of informality (Saavedra and Chong, 1999). 
  7workers and firms and may result in different sector assignments depending on the 
institutional framework and changes in regulations.  In this context, the informal sector should 
be viewed as part of a voluntary sector that, due to the laxity in enforcement of labor and 
other codes, is able to choose the optimal degree of participation in formal institutions 
(Maloney, 2003).
4  
  Individual preferences derive from current consumption ci1 and future consumption, 
which in turn equals next-period income zi. Assuming for simplicity symmetric logarithmic 
preferences, we write the expected utility: 
 
  V(ci1, ci2) = ln(ci1) + ln(ci2) = ln(ci1) + ln(zi) (5) 
 
Individuals first decide in which sector—IS or FS—to operate.  Then, in the former case, they 
allocate income between consumption and investment; and, in the latter case, individuals 
choose among consumption, investment and influence activities.  The equilibrium consists of 
such mutually consistent decisions. 
 
2.1. Equilibrium Analysis 
 
This analysis proceeds backwards, starting with the consumption-investment choices in each 
sector and then determining the allocation of the individuals across the two sectors. 
  Maximizing (5) subject to (1) for those in the informal sector, we obtain (clearly, there 




IS = yi / 2,  zi
IS = Byi / 2  (6) 
 
and the utility level of 
 
Vi
 IS = ln(yi /2) + ln (Byi/ 2)  (7) 
 




FS = yi / (3-L), xi
FS = yi(1-L)/ (3-L),   zi
FS = A (yi







i / (3-L)) (8) 
and 
                                                           
4 In this context, the traditional dualistic view (Lewis, 1954) becomes more relevant in the presence of deep 
recessions and large labor market distortions (Maloney, 2003). 
  8Vi
 FS = ln(yi / (3-L)) + ln { A (yi







i / (3-L))}   (9) 
 
  Anticipating consumption-investment decisions, individuals choose the sector in 
which they will produce by comparing the resulting expected utilities.  Comparing (7) and (9), 
an individual prefers to produce in the formal sector if and only if, 
 
Vi
 FS - Vi
 IS = ln(yi / (3-L)) + ln { A (yi







i / (3-L))}- [ln(yi /2) + ln (Byi/ 2)] = 
2ln( 2/ (3-L)) + ln { (A/B) (yi








  As the left-hand side of (10) increases with income, only sufficiently wealthy 
individuals produce in the formal sector, while poorer individuals move into the informal 
sector.  This occurs because the rich gain disproportionately more from being in the formal 
sector relative to poor individuals.  Letting y* denote the income threshold level above which 
such production takes place, we write: 
 
2ln(2/ (3-L)) + ln { (A/B) (y*











Equation (11), therefore, determines the threshold level and the relative size of the informal 
sector, H(y*). 
 
2.2. Comparative Statics 
 
Note that the left-hand side in (11) increases with y*.  This fact will play a role in establishing the 
comparative statics results below. 
 
Institutional quality. Differentiation reveals that the left-hand side in (11) increases with L, 
implying a negative relationship between L and y*, so that the better the institutional quality the 
smaller the share of the informal sector. This leads to: 
Proposition 1.  The lower the institutional quality the larger the size of the informal sector.   
 
Income inequality.  To study the effect of income inequality, suppose that the initial income 
distribution consists of two classes, the poor and the rich, whose respective relative size is P and 
  9R (P+R = 1, P>R), with initial incomes yP and yR, yP < yR.  It is not difficult to see that all rich 
individuals will produce in the formal sector.  In equilibrium, then, some of the poor enter the 
informal sector, whereas others produce in the formal sector; let I and F denote these 
fractions, I + F = P. 
  The equilibrium condition (11) then becomes as follows: 
 
2ln(2/ (3-L)) + ln {(A/B) [yP
1-L / (F yP
1-L + R yR
1-L)]}=  
2ln(2/ (3-L)) + ln {(A/B) [1 / (F + R (yR/ yP)
1-L)]}= 0  (12) 
 
This condition determines F, the fraction of the poor participating in the formal sector, hence, I = 
P-F, the share of the population in the informal sector. 
  Consider now a mean-preserving spread in incomes, so that yR’ = yR + e, yP’ = yP - e, e > 0.  
Such a spread increases the ratio yR/ yP, and hence, from (12), decreases F and increases the 
proportion of the population in the informal sector, I.  This illustrates the existence of a 
positive relationship between income inequality and the size of the informal sector.   
Moreover, the elasticity of the ratio yR/yP with respect to the mean-preserving spread is higher 
the lower the institutional quality L, implying that poor institutional quality exacerbates the 
effect of inequality on the size of the informal sector. 
  The results above may be summarized by:  
Proposition 2.  The increase in income inequality, by lowering the relative benefits of 
formality for the poor, causes an increase in the relative size of the informal sector.  This 
effect is stronger the lower the institutional quality. 
 
3. Empirical Approach 
 
In this section we study the empirical implications of the theoretical model above by using a 
benchmark specification based on the predictions of the model as well as on previous 
empirical research. In particular, we use the following specification: 
 
  j 3 j 2 j 1 0 j Tax Inst Ineq Informal α α α α + + + = j j X Rig ε α + + + β 4   for j=1, 2,…J (13) 
 
where “Informal” is the dependent variable and represents the size of the informal sector. 
Based on the model above, our key explanatory variables are “Ineq,” which represents a 
measure of income distribution, and “Inst,” which is a measure of institutional quality.   
  10Additionally, we follow previous research and also include other previously used controls, in 
particular, the variable “Tax,” which represents the tax burden (Thomas, 1992; Lippert and 
Walker, 1997; Cebula, 1997), and the variable “Rig” which is a measure that captures 
entrance rigidities (Schneider and Klingmair, 2003; Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer, 1997; 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón, 1998). Finally, X is a vector that includes some basic 
macroeconomic controls, namely output per capita, the rate of economic growth and the rate 
of inflation.  
  We use both cross-country and panel data approaches. In the former, the dependent 
variable is typically a “late value” or the average of the series available. In the case of the 
explanatory variables we use beginning-of-period values or earlier values (e.g., data 
corresponding to the 1970s or 1980s) in order to minimize potential endogeneity problems. In 
the case of the panel data approach, we take five-year averages and beginning-of- period 
values, in order to minimize for noise as well as endogeneity. This is explained in more detail 
below. 
  Measuring the size of the informal sector has been a difficult task.  To be as 
comprehensive as possible, we follow Chong and López-de-Silanes (2004) and use two 
alternative data series.  The first is from Schneider and Klingmair (2003) and is based on the 
so-called demand for currency approach.
5 These data provide recent cross-section measures, 
particularly for the 1990s.  This approach assumes that all hidden economic activity uses cash 
as the means of exchange, so that an increase in the shadow economy produces an increase in 
the demand for currency. To calculate excessive demand for money, a standard equation for 
currency demand is estimated along with controls typically linked to tax evasion, which is 
believed to be a major reason for the existence of the informal economy.
6 Using an empirical 
estimation for the expected values of currency holdings, they are then re-estimated under the 
assumption that the tax variable takes the value of zero. The difference between these two 
series represents the excessive currency demanded as the result of the existence of the 
                                                           
5 Another available data set that uses the currency demand approach is Botero, Djankov, La Porta et al. (2004), 
who largely base their series on Schneider and Enste (2000), which contains a less complete data set than 
Schneider and Klingmair (2003). Replicating all the empirical exercises using these data yield almost identical 
results. 
  11informal economy. The size of the informal economy, typically expressed as a percentage of 
GDP, is then determined by multiplying the excessive currency by the velocity of money, 
which is assumed to be the same in both the formal and informal economy.     
  The second data series is based on the Macroelectric Approach  (Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda, 1996). According to this method, the size of the informal economy may be 
measured from any discrepancy between an indicator of the overall economic activity and the 
official gross domestic product. Given the high correlation between consumption of electricity 
and economic activity, the growth rate of electricity consumption serves as an indicator of the 
evolution of the total gross domestic product.
7 Hence, any difference between the growth of 
electricity consumption and the growth of the official gross domestic product may be 
attributed to changes in the size of the informal economy. To calculate this measure, we use 
World Bank (2004) data on total electricity consumption.  Data on real (official) gross 
domestic product, measured as the nominal GDP deflated by the implicit gross domestic 
product deflator, was obtained from the International Monetary Fund (2004), using annual 
observations from 1960 to 2000.
8 The resulting estimates of the size of the informal sector are 
expressed as a percentage of GDP. Appendix 1 contains the list of countries used, and Table 1 
provides basic summary statistics on the size of the informal sector using the two data sources 
described above. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
6 The basic equation is   where C/M2 is the ratio 
of currency holdings to broad money, Y is the real per capita income, R is the interest rate paid on time deposits, 
(WS/NI) is the ratio of wages and salaries in the national income, and T is an income tax variable.   
( ) ( ) t t t t t Y R NI WS T M C ε α α α α α + + + + + = 4 3 2 1 0 2 ln / ln ln / ln
7 An explicit assumption is that the elasticity of electricity consumption to gross domestic product should be 
close to one. Since this assumption may be too strong, Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) perform sensitivity 
analysis allowing the value of the elasticity to vary across countries and time. These may account for 
technological changes in production process, variations of the sectoral composition of GDP and different 
production structures across countries. To account for the fact that economies may become more efficient in the 
use of electricity, we assume that the elasticity decreases by 0.05 from decade to decade (from 1.15 in the 1960s 
to 1 in the 1990s). The results, available on request, do not significantly change when applying different 
elasticities.  
8 Sources for seed values are Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997), Loayza (1996), Lackó (1996, 1998), Giles 
(1999), Schneider and Bajada (2003) and Schneider and Enste (2000).  
  12Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
         All Countries  Industrial Countries  Developing Countries
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev.
Gini Coefficient 0.39 (0.09)          0.32 (0.05)          0.40 (0.09)         
Size of Informal Sector
 - Schneider and Klingmair 0.32 (0.14)          0.17 (0.06)          0.36 (0.12)         
 - Macroelectric Approach 0.28 (0.21)          0.11 (0.14)          0.39 (0.21)         
 
 
This table contains estimates on the size of the informal sector using two data sources and methods, the currency 
demand approach applied by Schneider and Klingmair (2003), and our estimates for the Macroelectric Approach 
based on Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). Informal sector numbers are calculated as percent of gross domestic 
product. Specifics of the methods are described in the text.  
 
  With respect to the independent variables, we use the initial Gini coefficients, based 
on Deininger and Squire, 1997 as a proxy for income inequality. While the original data from 
Deininger and Squire go from 1960 to 1995 we are able to extend our inequality series using 
household data from Milanovic (2002a, 2002b) and by generating information using the 
coefficient of variation of income and the income’s linear correlation with ranks.
9  
  The institutional data come from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) produced 
by the PRS group and originally used by Knack and Keefer (1995), Hall and Jones (1999), 
and several other researchers.  The ICRG risk rating system assigns a numerical value to a 
predetermined range of risk components for about 130 countries for 1984 to 2000. In this 
paper we construct an average of the most commonly used institutional dimensions in the 
literature, in particular, government stability, corruption, rule of law, democratic 
accountability, and quality of bureaucracy quality. Additionally, we also consider two 
individual measures, corruption index and rule of law.
10 While these data are useful in our 
cross-country regressions as we are able to exploit beginning-of-the-period values (1984), 
their coverage is relatively limited when applying panel data analysis. In this latter case, we 
                                                           
9 For the sake of robustness, we also use alternative measures of income distribution such as the income share 
ratio of the top to the bottom quintile of the population as well as the income shares of the middle quintiles as 
well as other measures of inequality, particularly Theil and Atkinson indices. 
10 We also tested all the other ICRG individual measures and find very similar results. Furthermore, we use 
Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobatón (1998), and Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003), testing their 
additional measures of governance and obtaining similar results. These data are much more limited as they are 
restricted to the cross-section approach. Finally, we use data from Freedom House (2002) and obtain very similar 
results. As shown by Knack and Keefer (1995), the correlation between Freedom House measures and other 
institutional measures (especially ICRG) is extremely high. 
  13use data from Gastil (2002) instead.
11  These data, which contain an index of civil liberties and 
an index of political rights, were first used by Barro (1991). Freedom House (Gastil, 2002) 
publishes an annual assessment of the state of institutional freedom in each country. They 
report scores from 1 to 7, with lower scores denoting higher degrees of freedom. We rescaled 
these variables to 0-1, with higher scores implying more freedom, and we also compute an 
aggregate index, defined as the simple average of the civil liberties and political rights 
indices. While we use initial values in our cross-country regressions (1970), we are able to 
exploit the larger time-coverage for this variable in our panel exercises as the period goes 
from 1970 to 2000.   
  Our source for labor market rigidities is the aggregate index of de facto labor 
regulations constructed in Forteza and Rama (2002). This index is the simple average of the 
ratio of the minimum wage to unit labor costs in the manufacturing sector, social security 
contributions as a percentage of salaries, total trade union membership as a percentage of total 
labor force, and the share of general government employment in total employment.
12 As 
before, we use beginning-of-period data in the cross-section exercises and five-year averages 
in the panel exercises.   
  The data sources for the other controls employed in equation (13) consisted of the 
logarithm of initial per-capita income (Summers and Heston, 1991; World Bank, 2004), the 
average annual growth rate in gross domestic product per capita (Summers and Heston, 1991; 
World Bank, 2004), the initial rate of inflation (International Monetary Fund, 2004), and the 
initial corporate tax rate (KPMG, 2003).
13  
  
                                                           
11 While some panel exercises can be performed using the ICRG data, and result in similar findings, the dynamic 
panel methodology also employed cannot be used, as the number of observations is reduced drastically and does 
not allow the method to be applied. 
12 For robustness we follow Forteza and Rama (2002) and replicate the same exercise using a second index of 
regulations de facto, based on the simple average of the ratio of minimum wage to income per capita, the number 
of daysof maternity leave for a first child born without complications, the ratification of ILO Convention 87, 
which allows workers to organize, and the ratio of central government employment to total employment.  Results 
are very similar. Additionally, while limited for our purposes, we use data on labor cost by Heckman and Pagés 
(2002) whenever possible. As before, the results do not change. We also use some limited data on entry costs 
whenever possible (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer et al., 2003). Although the variable yields a positive and 
statistically significant sign, the results are not robust. 
13 In the case of these macro controls we also tested average values. The results are qualitatively identical. 
  144. Cross-Section Results 
 
Table 2 shows simple cross-country ordinary least squares findings based on our benchmark 
specification in (13) and using the three alternatives measures of the informal sector as 
described in the previous section. Consistent with the theoretical model above, the findings in 
this table underscore the relevance of both income inequality and institutional quality as key 
determinants of size of the informal sector.   
 
Table 2. Cross-Section: Ordinary Least Squares 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Constant 0.456 ** 0.093 -0.260 -1.567 **
(0.12)              (0.18)              (0.41)              (0.50)             
Output per capita 0.009 0.007 -0.019 -0.058
   (in logs) (0.02)              (0.02)              (0.06)              (0.06)             
Economic Growth -0.883 -0.735 1.524 1.707
(0.67)              (0.65)              (1.87)              (1.77)             
Inflation Rate 0.023 0.055 0.093 0.239
(0.08)              (0.07)              (0.22)              (0.20)             
Gini Coefficient 0.358 ** 1.399 ** 1.093 ** 5.298 **
(0.16)              (0.45)              (0.41)              (1.13)             
Institutions -0.104 ** -0.004 -0.025 0.376 **
(0.02)              (0.04)              (0.06)              (0.12)             
Gini * Institutions …    -0.268 ** …    -1.043 **
(0.10)              (0.24)             
Tax rate 0.263 ** 0.225 ** 0.186 0.171
(0.12)              (0.11)              (0.32)              (0.27)             
Labor Rigidities 0.112 0.077 0.365 0.183
(0.08)              (0.07)              (0.27)              (0.24)             
N o b s . 7 27 25 4
R**2 0.7317 0.7511 0.2868 0.4361




(*) statistically significant at ten percent; (**) statistically significant at five percent; (***) statistically 
significant at one percent. Standard errors are in parenthesis. We employ estimates on the size of the informal 
sector from two data sources and methods, the currency demand approach applied by Schneider and Klingmair 
(2003), and our estimates for the Macroelectric Approach based on Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). Informal 




  As predicted by Proposition 1 in the model above, the institutional variable is 
negatively and statistically significant linked with the size of the informal sector when 
estimating the size of the informal sector using the currency demand approach (Schneider and 
Klingmair, 2003) as shown in Regression 1.
14 If the institutional quality index increases by 
                                                           
14 This does not appear to be the case when using the Macroelectric approach, although the relationship is robust 
to a broad battery of institutional measures employed. In order to avoid unnecessary reporting such findings are 
  15one unit, the size of the informal sector, measured as a percentage of the GDP, is reduced by 
10.4 percent.   
  Furthermore, as predicted by Proposition 2, we find that there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between income inequality and the size of the informal 
sector.  For example, if income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, rises from, say, 
Mexican levels (0.49) to Brazilian levels (0.57), the size of the informal sector as a percentage 
of the GDP is predicted to increase by 2.92 percent.  As shown in Table 2, this finding holds 
regardless of the type of the method of estimation of the size of the informal sector.  More 
interestingly, we explore potential effects between the quality of institutions and inequality by 
introducing an interactive term between them. As shown in Regressions 2 and 4 in Table 2, 
the associated coefficient is negative and significant in both cases. Countries with poor 
institutional arrangements appear to have larger informal economies, especially so when 
income is unequally distributed.  It should be noticed that when including the interactive term, 
the coefficient of the institutional measure turns out to be statistically insignificant, implying 
that the interactive term between institutions and inequality is the more relevant one.  With 
respect to the other variables included in the regressions, the coefficient of the tax rate 
measure is, as expected, positive and statistically significant when using the currency demand 
approach to estimate the informal sector, although it yields no statistical significance when the 
Macroelectric approach is used.  Interestingly, the labor rigidities coefficient is not 
statistically significant, although it yields the expected sign.
15  The key results are robust to the 
measure of income inequality employed, as shown in Table 3, where a broad battery of 
inequality measures (income quintiles, income ratios, and the often used measures of 
inequality by Atkinson and Theil), rather than the Gini coefficient, are used.
16   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
not presented. The results in terms of sign and statistically significance are always identical to the ones reported 
on the tables in this paper, unless explicitly stated. We would be happy to distribute these findings upon request. 
15 Our results do not change when using other labor cost measures (Heckman and Pages, 2001) as well as other 
cost of entrance variables (Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes et al., 2000). 
16 For space reasons, only the coefficient of our variable of interest is reported. Overall, the coefficients of the 
other controls yield similar results to the full specification presented in Table 2. 
  16Table 3. Cross-Section, Ordinary Least Squares,  
Robustness to Changes in Inequality Measures 
 
I. Income Shares
   Top20 0.407 ** 1.285 **
(0.14)                     (0.43)                    
   Top40 0.520 ** 1.245 **
(0.17)                     (0.51)                    
   Middle 20 -0.880 ** -1.652 *
(0.42)                     (1.08)                    
   Bottom 40 -0.843 ** -2.276 **
(0.26)                     (0.84)                    
   Bottom 20 -1.525 ** -3.212 **
(0.45)                     (1.41)                    
II. Ratio of Income Shares
   Top20 / Bottom 20 0.005 ** 0.012 **
(0.00)                     (0.00)                    
   Top20 / Bottom 40 0.017 ** 0.041 **
(0.00)                     (0.02)                    
III. Other Measures of Inequality
   Theil Coefficient 1.131 ** 2.751 **
(0.34)                     (1.12)                    
   Atkinson's Inequality (n=1) 1.421 ** 2.829 **
(0.38)                     (1.34)                    
   Atkinson's Inequality (n=2) 0.959 ** 2.114 **








This table reports the coefficient of the inequality proxy when applying the benchmark specification (13) in the 
text. (*) statistically significant at ten percent; (**) statistically significant at five percent; (***) statistically 
significant at one percent. Standard errors are in parenthesis. We employ estimates on the size of the informal 
sector from two data sources and methods, the currency demand approach applied by Schneider and Klingmair 
(2003), and our estimates for the Macroelectric Approach based on Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). Informal 
sector numbers are calculated as percentage of gross domestic product.   
 
  While we use beginning-of-period values for the explanatory variables in the ordinary 
least squares exercise and late values for the dependent variable, the endogeneity between 
inequality and informality may still be a source of concern.  We therefore control for potential 
endogeneity by employing legal origin variables (La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer et al., 
1998), continental dummies, the average years of primary and secondary schooling attained 
by the population aged 25 or older (Barro and Lee, 2001), and the age dependency ratio 
defined as the number of people between 15 and 64 relative to the working population (World 
  17Bank, 2004).
17  The basic instrumental variables results are presented in Table 4 and are 
complemented with robustness checks for inequality measures in Table 5.  They are generally 
consistent with the ordinary least squares results presented above.   
    
Table 4. Cross-Section: Instrumental Variables 
 
Constant 0.394 ** -0.351 -0.560 -2.586 **
(0.15)              (0.34)              (0.57)              (0.99)             
Output per capita 0.015 0.009 -0.026 -0.089
   (in logs) (0.02)              (0.02)              (0.06)              (0.06)             
Economic Growth -0.397 0.075 2.503 2.748
(0.71)              (0.73)              (2.33)              (2.12)             
Inflation Rate 0.060 0.098 0.136 0.328 *
(0.09)              (0.08)              (0.23)              (0.20)             
Gini Coefficient 0.380 * 2.403 ** 1.679 ** 7.962 **
(0.20)              (0.79)              (0.71)              (2.44)             
Institutions -0.107 ** 0.080 -0.007 0.596 **
(0.02)              (0.07)              (0.06)              (0.22)             
Gini * Institutions …    -0.489 ** …    -1.517 **
(0.17)              (0.48)             
Tax rate 0.315 ** 0.274 ** 0.295 0.286
(0.14)              (0.13)              (0.40)              (0.36)             
Labor Rigidities 0.082 0.055 0.368 0.220
(0.09)              (0.09)              (0.27)              (0.25)             
N o b s . 6 56 55 05
R**2 0.6943 0.7198 0.2857 0.3991
Schneider and Klingmair  (2003) Macroelectric Approach





(*) statistically significant at ten percent; (**) statistically significant at five percent; (***) statistically 
significant at one percent. Standard errors are in parenthesis. We employ estimates on the size of the 
informal sector from two data sources and methods, the currency demand approach applied by 
Schneider and Klingmair (2003), and our estimates for the Macroelectric Approach based on Kaufmann 
and Kaliberda (1996). Informal sector numbers are calculated as percentage of gross domestic product. 
Specifics of the methods are described in the text. 
 
 
                                                           
17 Given the potential weakness of these instruments, we also apply a dynamic panel approach. See the following 
section. 
  18Table 5. Cross-Section Instrumental Variables,  
Robustness to Changes in Inequality Measures 
 
I. Income Shares
   Top20 0.265 * 1.556 **
(0.16)                (0.60)               
   Top40 0.329 * 2.008 **
(0.20)                (0.79)               
   Middle 20 -0.993 * -5.337 **
(0.63)                (2.38)               
   Bottom 40 -0.486 * -3.143 **
(0.30)                (1.17)               
   Bottom 20 -0.980 -7.289 **
(0.67)                (2.61)               
II. Ratio of Income Shares
   Top20 / Bottom 20 0.004 * 0.027 **
(0.00)                (0.01)               
   Top20 / Bottom 40 0.013 * 0.078 **
(0.01)                (0.03)               
III. Other Measures of Inequality
   Theil Coefficient 0.729 * 4.591 **
(0.43)                (1.66)               
   Atkinson's Inequality (n=1) 1.021 * 7.072 **
(0.64)                (2.40)               
   Atkinson's Inequality (n=2) 0.605 * 4.256 **








This table reports the coefficient of the inequality proxy when applying the 
benchmark specification (13) in the text. (*) statistically significant at ten 
percent; (**) statistically significant at five percent; (***) statistically 
significant at one percent. Standard errors are in parenthesis. We employ 
estimates on the size of the informal sector from two data sources and 
methods, the currency demand approach applied by Schneider and Klingmair 
(2003), and our estimates for the Macroelectric Approach based on Kaufmann 
and Kaliberda (1996). Informal sector numbers are calculated as percentage of 
gross domestic product. Specifics of the methods are described in the text. 
 
  As predicted by Proposition 1, the sign of the institutional variable is negative and 
statistically significant at conventional levels when using the currency demand approach to 
estimate the informal sector. Using Regression 1 in Table 4, if the institutional variable 
increases by one unit, the size of the informal sector, measured as a percentage of the GDP, is 
  19reduced by 10.7 percent.  Furthermore, consistent with Proposition 2, the coefficient of the 
inequality variable is always positive and statistically significant. When the Gini coefficient 
increases from Mexican to Brazilian levels, the relative size of the informal sector is expected 
to increase by 3.1 percent, slightly more than under ordinary least squares. As in the OLS 
case, the interactive term between institutions and inequality is always negative and 
statistically significant, regardless of the method used to estimate the size of the informal 
sector (see Regressions 2 and 4).      
 
5. Panel Data Findings 
 
We also assemble a panel data set of 57 industrial and developing countries, spanning the 
corresponding full time periods for each sample; the data set consists of at most six non-
overlapping 5-year period observations over the sample period 1970 to 2000.
18  This selection 
is based on the premise that inequality is persistent, as changes occur relatively slowly over 
time and the observed variation from year to year may be rather small (Chong and Gradstein, 
2004).
19  Because of data limitations, we are only able to use the Macroelectric approach in 
order to estimate an informal sector series.
20  Fixed effects ordinary least squares regressions 
are presented in Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 6.  Overall, the results are very similar to those 
from the cross-section regressions.  In particular, the coefficient of the inequality variable is 
positive and statistically significant at five percent, while the interactive term between 
institutions and inequality is negative, although it is now statistically significant only at ten 
percent;
21 Regression 1 in Table 6 predicts that an increase in income inequality from 
Mexican to Brazilian levels would generate an increase of about 4.38 percent in the size of the 
informal sector.  Notice that, unlike the cross-section cases, the coefficient of labor rigidities 
                                                           
18 In order to maximize the time-span of the panel we use the Gastil institutional data. The ICRG data cannot be 
used, as it covers only the period 1984-2000, which results in too few usable observations. 
19 For the sake of completeness we also perform our analysis using different year groupings (ten years) as well as 
with annual data whenever possible. We find very similar results regardless of the sample size or data stacking. 
20 While theoretically it is also possible to create a time-series using the currency demand approach, our efforts 
did not yield credible results, perhaps because of the poor data available in many developing countries.  
21 Also, notice that the coefficient of the institutional variable is not statistically significant when the interactive 
term is not included (see Regression 1).   
  20yields the expected sign at statistically significant levels; however, the coefficient of the tax 
rate yields an unexpected negative sign, although it is weakly statistically significant.
22   
 
Table 6. Panel Data Approaches 
                             
    Panel OLS with Fixed Effects  Panel IV with Fixed Effects 
      [1]     [2]     [3]     [4]    
                 
Constant    0.350** 0.135  0.350** -0.171  
            (0.16)            (0.19)            (0.16)            (0.25)  
Output per capita  -0.029  -0.038* -0.029  -0.031  
               (0.02)            (0.02)            (0.02)            (0.02)  
Economic Growth  -0.188  -0.134  -0.188  0.198  
            (0.44)            (0.43)            (0.44)            (0.44)  
Inflation Rate  -0.009  0.034  -0.009  0.000  
            (0.09)            (0.08)            (0.09)            (0.09)  
Gini Coefficient  0.587** 1.313** 0.587** 1.973 ** 
            (0.13)            (0.42)            (0.13)            (0.56)  
Gini * Institutions  …   -1.146* …    -1.483 * 
                (0.61)              (0.77)  
Institutions 0.042  0.497* 0.042  0.610 * 
            (0.06)            (0.26)            (0.06)            (0.32)  
Tax rate    -0.271* -0.297* -0.271* -0.199   
            (0.15)            (0.15)            (0.15)            (0.18)  
Labor Rigidities  0.243** 0.217** 0.243** 0.175 * 
            (0.10)            (0.10)            (0.10)            (0.10)  
                             
               
Nobs.    317  317  281  281  
R**2    0.1426  0.1541  0.1671  0.1780  
                             
               
(*) statistically significant at ten percent; (**) statistically significant at five percent; (***) 
statistically significant at one percent. Standard errors are in parenthesis. We employ 
estimates on the size of the informal sector using the Macroelectric Approach based on 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). Informal sector is calculated as percentage of the gross 
domestic product. Specifics of the methods are described in the text. 
 
  In columns 3 and 4 of Table 6, we tackle the potential endogeneity problem between 
inequality and the size of the informal sector by using an IV technique and the same 
instruments as in the cross-country case, namely, legal origin variables, continental dummies, 
                                                           
22 When repeating the econometric exercise excluding this variable the signs and statistical significance of all the 
  21average years of schooling attained, and the age dependency ratio. Overall, we obtain 
virtually the same results as in the pooled fixed effects case—that is, a positive coefficient in 
the inequality term, and a negative coefficient in the interactive term. Also, as before, we 
obtain a positive and statistically significant sign in the labor rigidities variable and, when 
including the interactive term (Regression 4), our results show the relevance of the non-linear 
effect between informality, inequality and institutions.
23  
  An obvious problem in both the cross-section and the panel regressions using 
instrumental variables is the difficulty with finding good instruments. While some instruments 
may be deemed acceptable (e.g., legal origin, continental dummies) others may be considered 
less than perfect, as they may be potentially correlated with the dependent variable (e.g., age 
dependency ratio, schooling).  Because of this, we also applied a GMM-IV dynamic panel 
data methodology, that allows us to take into account unobserved country and time specific 
effects, control for potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables (Arellano and Bover, 
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).  Using this method we estimate a regression equation in 
differences and a regression equation in levels simultaneously, with each equation using its 
own specific set of instrumental variables, as shown in Table 7 (further details of the 
estimation procedure are documented in an Appendix available on request).  As in the other 
cases, we find that the coefficient of the Gini index is positive and statistically significant in 
the two specifications considered. We also find that the sign of the interactive term is 
negative, although only weakly statistically significant in Regression 2.  The sign of the 
institutional variable reverses from positive, as in all our previous results, to negative, 
although the corresponding coefficient is not statistically significant.   
    
                                                                                                                                                                                     
other variables do not change. 
23 As in the ordinary least squares case, the coefficient of the tax rate still yields the wrong sign, although with no 
statistical significance when including the interactive term. 
  22Table 7. Dynamic Panel Data Approach 
             
     Dynamic Panel Data  
      [1]     [2]    
          
Constant    0.779** 0.896  ** 
             (0.09)            (0.15)  
Output per capita  -0.059**  -0.080 ** 
               (0.01)            (0.02)  
Economic Growth  -0.123**  -0.182 * 
             (0.06)            (0.11)  
Inflation Rate  0.094**  0.083 * 
             (0.04)            (0.05)  
Gini Coefficient  0.172**  0.236 ** 
             (0.09)            (0.10)  
Gini*Institutions     -1.265 * 
                 (0.75)  
Institutions   -0.109  -0.048  
             (0.13)            (0.14)  
Tax rate    -0.253** -0.164  * 
             (0.06)            (0.09)  
Labor Rigidities  0.337**  0.292 ** 
             (0.06)            (0.08)  
                 
         
No. Observations  183  183  
R**2    0.373  0.371  
Specification Tests (p-values)      
 - Sargan Test          (0.893)          (0.872)  
 - 2nd-Order Correlation          (0.301)          (0.326)  
                 
         
Regressions are performed with fixed effects. (*) statistically significant at ten percent; 
(**) statistically significant at five percent; (***) statistically significant at one percent. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. We employ estimates on the size of the informal sector 
using the Macroelectric Approach based on Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). Informal 
sector is measured as the percentage of the gross domestic product. Specifics of the 
methods are described in the text. 
 
  With respect to the other controls, we obtain the expected signs in the case of output 
per capita, rate of economic growth, and the inflation rate, as well as with respect to the labor 
rigidities variable, all at significance levels of ten percent or better; but the coefficient of the 
tax rate gives, as before, the wrong sign at ten percent or better. 
 
  236. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents theory and evidence on the relationship between institutional quality, 
inequality and informality. We propose a simple theoretical model in which the lower the 
institutional quality, the larger the size of the informal sector.  Increasing income inequality, 
by lowering the relative benefits of formality for the poor, also causes informality to increase. 
We test our theory using different proxies of the size of the informal sector, income 
inequality, and institutional quality to confirm our model.  We also use a broad range of 
econometric techniques for both a pure cross-country sample and a panel sample of countries, 
particularly ordinary least squares and instrumental variables, as well as pooled fixed effects 
and dynamic panel data models.   
  Overall, the empirical findings are consistent with the basic predictions of the model, 
in particular regarding (i) the predicted link between income inequality and the size of the 
informal sector, and (ii) the non-linear relationship between institutions and inequality and 
their corresponding impact on informality.  The evidence is also suggestive on the link with 
the linear term of the institutional variable but such evidence is, perhaps, not sufficiently 
robust, as it fails to be corroborated when using all the econometric methods applied, 
particularly the dynamic panel data approach.  
Finally, the empirical evidence also shows that other commonly believed determinants 
of the size of the informal sector do not necessarily behave as expected.  While the labor 
rigidities variable yields a positive and statistically significant sign, including the tax rate 
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  28Appendix 1. Full List of Countries
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1 ARE U nited Arab Em irates 61 LBY Libya
2 A R G A rgentina 62 L K A S ri L anka
3A U S A u s t r a l i a 6 3L S O L e s o t h o
4 AUT Austria 64 LTU Lithuania
5 BEL Belgium 65 LUX Luxembourg
6B F A B u r k i n a  F a s o 6 6L V A L a t v i a
7 BGD Bangladesh 67 M AR M orocco
8 BGR Bulgaria 68 M D G M adagascar
9B H R B a h r e i n 6 9M E X M e x i c o
10 BH S Baham as 70 M LI M ali
11 B L R B ielorussia 71 M L T M alta
12 BOL Bolivia 72 M NG M ongolia
13 BRA Brazil 73 M RT M auritania
14 BW A Botswana 74 M US M auritius
15 CAN Canada 75 M YS M alaysia
16 CHE Switzerland 76 NER Niger
17 CHL Chile 77 NGA Nigeria
18 CHN China 78 NIC Nicaragua
19 CIV Cote d' Ivoire 79 NLD Netherlands
20 COL Colombia 80 NOR Norway
21 CRI Costa Rica 81 NPL Nepal
22 CYP Cypr us 82 NZL New Zeal and
23 CZE Czech Republic 83 OM N Oman
24 DEU Germany 84 PAK Pakistan
25 DNK Denmark 85 PAN Panama
26 DOM Dominican Republic 86 PER Peru
27 DZA Algeria 87 PHL Philippines
28 ECU Ecuador 88 PNG Papua New Guinea
29 EGY Egypt 89 POL Poland
30 ESP Spain 90 PRT Portugal
31 EST Estonia 91 PRY Paraguay
32 ETH Ethiopia 92 QAT Qatar
33 FIN Finland 93 ROM Romania
34 FRA France 94 RUS Russia
35 GBR United Kingdom 95 RW A Rwanda
36 GHA Ghana 96 SAU Saudi Arabia
37 GIN Guinea 97 SEN Senegal
38 GNB Guinea Bissau 98 SGP Singapore
39 G R C G reece 99 SLE Sierra Leone
40 GTM Guatemala 100 SLV El Salvador
41 HKG Hong Kong 101 SVK Slovak Rep.
42 HND Honduras 102 SVN Slovenia
43 HRV Croatia 103 SW E Sweden
44 HUN Hungary 104 SYR Syria
45 IDN Indonesia 105 THA Thailand
46 IND India 106 TTO Trinidad and Tobago
47 IRL Ireland 107 TUN Tunisia
48 IRN Iran 108 TUR Turkey
49 IRQ Iraq 109 TW N Taiwan
50 ISR Israel 110 TZA Tanzania
51 ITA Italy 111 UGA Uganda
52 JAM Jamaica 112 UKR Ukraine
53 JOR Jordan 113 URY Uruguay
54 JPN Japan 114 USA United States
55 KAZ Kazhakstan 115 VEN Venezuela
56 KEN Kenya 116 VNM Vietnam
57 KGZ Kirgyz Rep. 117 YEM Yemen
58 KOR Korea, Rep. 118 YSR Yugoslavia
59 KW T Kuwait 119 ZAF South Africa
60 LBN Lebanon 120 ZM B Zambia
121 ZW E Zimbabwe  
                                                           
24 Not all the countries are included in all the regressions as, depending on the method used, other variables 
limited the sample size. 
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